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ARGUMENT 
I. AS THE U.S. SUPREME COURTfS RECENT DECISION IN PENSON 
V. OHIO MAKES CLEAR, MR. DUNN WAS PREJUDICIALLY DEPRIVED 
OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
In Penson v. Ohio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4020 (U.S., Nov. 29, 
1988), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed and revitalized its 
decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The 
Court held that the Ohio Court of Appeals erred in granting 
Penson's counsel leave to withdraw from his criminal appeal 
without first determining, based on an Anders brief and the 
court's independent review of the record, both that counsel 
had conducted a "conscientious examination of the case" and 
that there were'no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The Court 
further ruled: 
Most significantly, the Ohio court erred by failing 
to appoint new counsel to represent petitioner after 
it had determined that the record supported "several 
arguable claims. " App. 41. As Anders unambiguously 
provides, "if [the appellate court] finds any of 
the legal points arguable on the merits (and 
therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, 
afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to 
argue the appeal." 
57 U.S.L.W. at 402 (citation omitted^. 
The principles of Penson clearly establish that Mr. Dunn 
was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel on appeal 
by the substantial failure of both his counsel and this Court 
to adhere to the Anders requirements. While an Anders brief 
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ostensibly was filed on Mr. Dunn's behalf, that brief was 
woefully inadequate for the reasons discussed in detail in 
Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this appeal. Certainly, it was 
inadequate to support a finding either that counsel had 
conducted a "conscientious examination" of the case or that 
the appeal was wholly frivolous. Nor did this Court 
specifically so find. State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 
1982 ) . Instead, this Court made the conclusory ( and incorrect) 
finding that "counsel has complied in every respect with the 
'Anders' requirements" and granted the motion to withdraw. 
Then, without benefit of competent adversary presentation of 
the issues, the Court rejected the claims raised in both the 
Anders brief and the pro se brief as being "without merit." 
Id. As demonstrated in Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this 
appeal, some of the claims raised on his direct appeal were 
meritorious. Under Penson, this Court should have either 
denied Mr. Taylor's motion to withdraw or appointed substitute 
appellate counsel. The Court's failure to do so "deprived 
both the petitioner and itself of the benefit of an adversary 
examination and presentation of the issues." 57 U.S.L.W. at 
4022. 
Of further significance here is Penson's holding that 
it is inappropriate to apply either the prejudice requirement 
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or the 
harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
2 
18 (1967), to a violation of Anders that leaves a defendant 
without representation during an appellate court's decisional 
process, such as occurred here. Such a violation, unlike a 
case in which the defendant is afforded counsel but the 
assistance rendered is ineffective, wholly deprives the 
defendant of his right to counsel on appeal, and is thus 
presumptively prejudicial. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4023. Thus, Mr. 
Dunn was deprived of his right to counsel on his direct appeal 
by this Court's failure to appoint him substitute appellate 
counsel and that deprivation was prejudicial. Having been 
prejudicially deprived of counsel on his direct appeal, Mr. 
Dunn's failure to raise any issue on direct appeal cannot 
preclude review of his habeas corpus petition. 
In its brief, the State wholly ignores the performance 
of Mr. Dunn's counsel. Rather, the State repeatedly points 
to the pro se brief Mr. Dunn filed on his direct appeal, 
implying that a pro se brief somehow remedied any and all 
deficiencies in his counsel's performance. Under Penson, 
however, Mr. Dunn is legally presumed to have been prejudiced 
by the deprivation of counsel on appeal and his pro se attempts 
to raise issues despite that constitutional deprivation are 
irrelevant. 
Moreover, it cannot reasonably be contended that Mr. 
Dunn's attempt to argue his case pro se compensates for the 
denial of his right to counsel on appeal. Notably, the State 
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does not even attempt to demonstrate that the quality of Mr. 
Dunn's brief was comparable to that of a brief prepared by 
competent counsel. Rather, the State erroneously relies on 
the simple fact that a pro se brief was filed. But, as 
reiterated by the Supreme Court in Penson, 
Absent representation, however, it is unlikely that 
a criminal defendant will be able adequately to test 
the government's case, for, as Justice Sutherland 
wrote in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
"[even] the intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. " 
Id., at 69. 
* * * 
As we stated in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 
(1985): 
"In bringing an appeal as of right from 
his conviction, a criminal defendant is 
attempting to demonstrate that the 
conviction, with its consequent drastic 
loss of liberty, is unlawful. To 
prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant 
must face an adversary proceeding that -
- like a trial -- is governed by intricate 
rules that to a layperson would be 
hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented 
appellant -- like an unrepresented 
defendant at trial --is unable to protect 
the vital interests at stake." 16.. , at 
396. 
57 U.S.L.W. at 4022. 
Thus, the very basis of the sixth amendment right to counsel 
on appeal is the presumed inability of the criminal defendant 
to adequately represent himself on appeal. Mr. Dunn's pro 
se brief gives no reason to doubt the soundness of that 
presumption. 
4 
Under Anders and Penson, Mr. Dunn's right to counsel on 
appeal was unconstitutionally denied and he is entitled to 
a new appeal from his conviction and sentencing. 
Unfortunately, the original record in Mr. Dunn's criminal case 
has been completely destroyed by the State. First, during 
the proceedings below it was discovered that the court 
reporter's notes from the sentencing hearing on the second 
degree murder conviction were lost by Sevier County and could 
not be located despite a court-ordered search. R. 15, 23, 
24, & 51. Then, after Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this appeal 
was prepared and filed, the remaining portions of the record 
were transmitted to the Attorney General's office, where they 
were destroyed. See, letter from David B. Watkiss to R. Paul 
Van Dam dated January 13, 1989, attached as Addendum MA" . 
A copy of the trial transcript has been obtained from the 
county attorney (see, letter from Dan R. Larsen to Geoffrey 
J. Butler dated January 23, 1989, attached as Addendum "B") 
and is now on file with this Court. As of the date of this 
Reply Brief, however, other critical portions of the record 
have not been recovered. Vital portions still missing include 
the papers filed with the court, all trial exhibits (including 
the inflammatory photographs admitted into evidence against 
Mr. Dunn), and the transcript of the preliminary hearing (in 
which the circumstances of the search and seizure of the 
bullets admitted into evidence against Mr. Dunn were 
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established). If this record cannot be recovered, a 
constitutionally adequate review of Mr, Dunn's conviction 
and sentencing cannot now be afforded and this Court must 
reverse Mr. Dunn's conviction and grant him a new trial. 
II. A DEPRIVATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON 
APPEAL IS CLEARLY SUBJECT TO POST-CONVICTION REVIEW 
REGARDLESS OF A FAILURE TO RAISE IT ON DIRECT APPEAL 
In response to Mr. Dunn's contention that he was denied 
his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 
the State contends that various precedents of this Court 
reject the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel 
on appeal may constitute good cause for a procedural default. 
The State cites Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983), a case also relied upon by Mr. Dunn. Although 
correctly citing Codianna for the narrow proposition that not 
all deficiencies in counsel's performance constitute "unusual 
circumstances" so as to warrant collateral review of issues 
that could have been raised on direct appeal (State's brief 
at 7), the State ignores the gravamen of the Codianna opinion: 
where counsel's performance is so deficient as to violate 
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel, habeas review is mandated despite a failure to raise 
the issue on direct appeal. 
If counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous 
to deprive petitioner of the effective assistance 
of counsel, they constituted a violation of due 
6 
process that is clearly reviewable on appeal or by 
postconviction review. 
660 at P.2d 1105.x 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Penson, the 
outright denial of Mr. Dunn's sixth amendment right to counsel 
on appeal, unlike a case such as Codianna based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel alone, is presumptively prejudicial. 
Thus, the principle established by Codianna that a denial of 
the right to counsel will excuse the failure to raise a claim 
on direct appeal and permit collateral review of the claim, 
applies even more forcefully here. 
The narrow exception to the procedural default rule 
based upon the sixth amendment right to counsel and adopted 
by this Court in Codianna is mandated by the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), 
discussed at pages 16 to 17 of Mr. Dunn's opening brief, a 
1
 In Codianna, this Court reviewed the performance of 
the petitioner's trial counsel, but ultimately dismissed the 
petition because no sixth amendment violation was found. 
Highly incriminating evidence adduced at trial assured 
Codianna's conviction despite deficiencies in his counsel's 
performance. Presumably, had the Court found that Codianna 
was prejudiced by his counsel's performance at trial, it would 
also have found that his appellate counsel's failure to raise 
the ineffectiveness issue also constituted a violation of 
his sixth amendment right, thus excusing the technical 
procedural default. See, United States ex. rel. Barnard v. 
Lane, 819 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987) (trial counsel's failure 
to tender jury instruction on defendant's only defense of 
justification violated defendant's sixth amendment right; 
appellate counsel equally ineffective for failure to raise 
issue on appeal; grant of habeas corpus petition affirmed). 
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decision not even mentioned in the State's brief. 
Rather, the State emphasizes this Court's decision in 
Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), which might, at 
first blush, be construed to contradict Codianna. This Court's 
reference to Hafen in Codianna may indicate, however, that 
the two decisions are reconcilable. A careful reading of the 
opinions reveals critical distinctions between Hafen and both 
Codianna and the case at hand. See, 660 P. 2d at 1105. In 
Hafen, the sole basis for petitioner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was counsel's alleged failure to 
challenge a juror who petitioner knew and to raise that issue 
on appeal. Noting that the petitioner had an adequate 
opportunity to complain about counsel's alleged failure both 
in the trial court and in lengthy direct appeal proceedings, 
this Court held the claim waived. Id. at 876. Unlike the 
claims at issue here and in Codianna, the claim in Hafen might 
reasonably be viewed as within the ability of a layperson to 
adequately raise without the assistance of trained legal 
assistance. Moreover, given satisfactory performance of 
counsel in all other respects, the single alleged deficiency 
in Hafen probably did not rise to the level of a sixth 
amendment violation. 
In the final analysis, however, the continued viability 
of Hafen must be seriously questioned in light of the later 
Codianna decision and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Murray 
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v. Carrier, supra.2 To the extent Hafen or any other Utah 
case holds to the contrary, it must be overruled. 
III. COLLATERAL REVIEW OF CONVICTIONS UPON A SHOWING THAT 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO APPELLATE COUNSEL HAS BEEN 
VIOLATED WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THE FINALITY OF CRIMINAL 
JUDGMENTS 
Fantasizing a never-ending stream of post-conviction 
petitions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
as a result of granting relief to a single petitioner in this 
case, the State urges this Court to affirm the district court 
in order to keep the floodgates closed. On examination, 
however, the State's imagined flood evaporates. 
Certainly an overburdened judiciary and the finality of 
judgments are legitimate concerns. The exception to the direct 
appeal rule urged here, however, is an extremely narrow one 
that does not seriously undermine those concerns. 
First, this case is unusual in important respects. As 
discussed in Point I above, Mr. Dunn was not merely denied 
Other decisions supporting an exception to the 
procedural default rule based upon the sixth amendment right 
to counsel are United States ex. rel. Barnard v. Lane, 819 
F.2d 798, 801-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (M[w]hen a constitutional 
claim is waived because of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the responsibility for the default is imputed to the state 
under the sixth amendment," icl. at 801); Gray v. Greer, 800 
F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1985) (reissued Sept. 25, 1986); United 
States ex. rel. Garner v. McEvers, 690 F. Supp. 635, 637 n.2 
(N.D. 111. 1988); Deutscher v. Whitley, 663 F. Supp. 793, 795-
96 & 799 (D. Nev.), reh'g denied, 671 F.Supp. 1264 (1987) 
(defendant's procedural default excused in habeas corpus 
proceeding where counsel was ineffective for not raising claim 
on first appeal and post-conviction proceeding). 
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effective assistance of counsel, but was wholly deprived of 
the assistance of counsel on appeal by the failure of counsel 
and this Court to adhere to the requirements of Anders on his 
direct appeal. Presumably, such cases are relatively few in 
number and strict adherence by the courts to the Anders 
safeguards -- adherence which Penson requires -- can all but 
eliminate such claims. 
Secondly, claims based solely upon the ineffective 
assistance of counsel must pass muster under the restrictive 
Strickland test. Although certainly many habeas petitions 
may be filed, given the low threshold of performance and the 
show of prejudice required by Strickland, relatively few will 
warrant review. 
Finally, in cases involving indigent defendants, the State 
may effectively limit the number of ineffective assistance 
claims by requiring appeals to be handled by different 
appointed counsel than trial counsel, thus providing for an 
independent review of trial counsel's performance. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REVIEW THE TRIAL 
RECORD BEFORE SUMMARILY DISMISSING MR. DUNN'S CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL. 
At Point II of its brief, the State argues that because 
Mr. Dunn's criminal trial record is not a part of the record 
on this appeal, this Court must presume regularity in the trial 
proceedings. The reason the trial record was excluded from 
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the record on appeal is obviously that it was never filed in 
the proceedings below. Far from supporting a presumption of 
regularity in the trial proceedings, the absence of the 
criminal trial record from the district court file supports 
only a finding of error in the proceedings below. 
A habeas corpus petition based upon a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise particular 
issues simply cannot be resolved without a review of the trial 
record. In Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(reissued Sept. 11, 1986), the district court denied the 
defendant's habeas corpus petition claiming ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel without reviewing the trial 
record. The court of appeals reversed, explaining: 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is based on failure to raise viable issues, the 
district court must examine the trial court record 
to determine whether appellate counsel failed to 
present significant and obvious issues on appeal. 
* * * 
Respondent may well be correct in its assertion 
that appellate counsel strategically chose not to 
raise certain issues on appeal. We hold only that 
the determination of whether the decision was 
strategic requires an examination of the trial 
record. 
Id. at 646. Thus, the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing Mr. Dunn's habeas corpus petition without first 
reviewing the trial record and the briefs filed on Mr. Dunn's 
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direct appeal to determine whether Mr, Dunn was denied 
effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
The district court's order should therefore be reversed 
and this case remanded for a determination of Mr. Dunn's claims 
based upon a review of the trial record, unless such a review 
has now been precluded by the State's destruction of the 
record. In that event, this Court should reverse Mr. Dunn's 
conviction and grant a new trial. 
DATED this (j ^"day of February, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
DAVID B/ WATKISS 
DEBRA j(/ MOORE 
CAROLYN COX 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant Robert W. Dunn were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
^ ^ a y of February, 1989. 
fjikt^Pm^_ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
LAW OFF ICES 
WATKISS £ CAMPBELL 
Honorable R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah State Attorney General 
Utah State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Dunn v. Cook. Case No. 88 0067 (S. Ct.) 
Dear General Van Dam: 
At the request of Chief Justice Hall, we represent plaintiff-appellant Robert Dunn 
in the above-captioned Supreme Court appeal of the denial of his habeas corpus petition. 
Following the filing of appellant's brief in September of 1988, our office transmitted the 
transcript of the original trial court in which-Mr. Dunn was convicted to your office for use 
in preparation of the State's brief. After receiving the State's brief, Carolyn Cox of our 
office called Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General, to obtain the trial court record 
back for use in preparing our reply brief and so that we could have the record properly 
placed before the Supreme Court. 
Upon reaching Mr. Larsen, he informed Ms. Cox that the original record had been 
irretrievably lost by the State. Mr. Larsen reports that the record apparently was taken out 
with the trash, and its loss not discovered until the record had been destroyed. We were 
not informed of this fact when it happened, but were only told when our office called to 
retrieve the record. 
We assume that the State's destruction of this critical record was inadvertent. 
However, it was seriously negligent and the State's failure to inform our office promptly 
raises other serious questions. Most critical, however, destruction of the record may 
^ - -: - - u -
ec j - : i-j ; 
BY HAND 
WATKISS & C A M P B E L L 
Honorable R. Paul Van Dam 
Page 2 
January 13, i 'W 
irreparable and unfairly prejudice Mr. Dunn. We expect that prompt remedial action will 
be taken, if remedial action is possible. Furthermore, if replacement of the original trial 
court record is not possible, we will seek the release of our client on those grounds, as 
meaningful review of our client's habeas corpus petition and appeal will be impossible 
without the trial record. 
Sincerely, 
DAVID B. WATKISS 
DBW:sjh 
cc: Hon. Geoffrey Butler 
Dan R. Larsen, Esq. 
Robert Dunn 
bcc: DJM 
CC 
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THK ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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R. I\V L VAN DAM 
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h W . «• [>OHi : S C M I K K 
----=---**>--- January 23, 1989 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Dunn v. Cook, Case No. 880067 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
In response to the attached letter dated January 13, 
1989, from David B. Watkiss to R. Paul Van Dam, the original 
trial transcript and court record from Mr. Dunn's 1980 murder 
conviction have been irretrievably lost by our office. However, 
because these documents were not a part of the record in the 
habeas trial court nor are they a part of the record on appeal, 
their loss is immaterial to the present appeal. 
In any event, a copy of the trial transcript has been 
obtained from the Sevier County Attorney's Office and delivered 
to Mr. Watkiss. Copies of the pleadings will also be made 
available ones received from the Sevier County Attorney's Office. 
It has further come to my attention that Mr. Dunn is 
personally in possession of a copy of the trial transcript given 
to him by his former counsel Marcus Taylor. Thus, Mr. Dunn has 
not been prejudiced in preparing his Reply Brief. 
Regarding the lost originals, my law clerk unwisely 
placed the cardboard box containing the transcript and record 
near the waste can in my office. He had been researching issues 
on the case and was returning the transcript as well as 
submitting his research memo. That evening, the custodian 
apparently removed the box believing it to be waste. I was 
unaware that the box had been returned to my office or discarded 
by the custodian until several days later. Once discovered, 
236 STATK CAPITOL • SALT l-\KK CITY. ITAH B4 I 14 • T K L E P H O N K : BO I -.%V*- I <) I " 
FAX NO. BO ! -.%W I ILM 
Geoffrey Butler 
January 23, 1989 
Page 2 
ray law clerk and two custodian supervisors emptied the capitol's 
large waste crusher and searched for the box and its contents. 
Unfortunately, they were never recovered. 
If the Court wishes further information, please notify 
me. 
Very truly yours, 
DRL/pa 
Enclosure 
cc: R. Paul Van Dam 
David B, Watkiss 
